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Special Counsel to the Commissioner, New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate,
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Until 1972, the United States Supreme Court had paid scant attention to cases
dealing with the legal rights of mentally handicapped persons. Due in large
measure to the few lawyers available to represent such persons, cases involving
their procedural and substantive rights rarely even appeared on the Court's
docket.
After specialized programs were created, employing trained, skilled counsel
retained exclusively to represent the mentally ill [1], and after the Court ruled in a
1972 criminal case that the "nature and duration of commitment [must] bear a
reasonable relationship to the purpose for which the individual is committed" [2],
the Court began to look more seriously at the constitutional contours of civil
mental health law in at least three major subject matter areas: involuntary civil
commitment; the right to treatment; and the right to refuse treatment. These
rulings are of great importance to the full range of mental health practitioners; the
cases' impact on their practice - especially in any institutional setting - cannot be
overstated.
Basically, the guiding principles governing this area of the law are actually
quite clear: courts will "take cognizance of valid consitutional claims whether
arising in federal or state institutions" [3], and , in the specific context of mental
hospitals, "where 'treatment' is the sole asserted ground of depriving a person of
liberty, it is plainly unacceptable to suggest that courts are powerless to determine
whether the asserted ground is present" [4]. This is so because "civil commitment
for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due
process protection" [5]. This backdrop has been strengthened by more recent
court decisions indicating that the United States Supreme Court will weigh
treatment issues [6] and, at the least, will not reject out of hand the notion that the
right to refuse treatment is a matter for court consideration [7]. An examination
of each of the subject areas referred to above reflects how the Court has chosen to
implement these guiding principles.
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Involuntary Civil Commitment
The first issue to be considered is the standard for involuntary hospitalization:
under what circumstances may the state hospitalize a person against that person's
will? In O'Connor v. Donaldson [8], the Court held that "a State cannot
constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable
of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and
responsible family members or friends" [9], declaring the existence of a
"constitutional right to freedom" [10]. In the body of its opinion, the Court asked
rhetorically:
May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its citizens from exposure to those whose
ways are different? One might as well ask if the State, to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all who
are physically unattractice or socially eccentric. Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot
constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty [11].
Subsequently, state courts have held that "dangerous conduct is not identical with
criminal conduct" [12], and that dangerous conduct "involves not merely
violation of social norms enforced by criminal sanctions, but significant physical
or psychological injury to persons or substantial destruction of property" [13]; it
is also a given that "a risk of future conduct which is merely socially undesirable"
[14] is not a sufficient basis upon which to order commitment [15].
Following its O'Connor decision, the Supreme Court subsequently turned its
attention to the substance of the civil commitment hearing itself, deciding cases on
the diverse questions of burden of proof, "voluntary" commitments of minors,
and procedural rights at a penal facility-hospital transfer hearing. On the question
of burden of proof, the court ruled that the appropriate standard was "equal to or
greater than the 'clear and convincing' standard [of evidence]" [16], an echo of
earlier state court decisions:
The burden should not be placed on the civilly committed patient to justify his right to liberty.
Freedom from involuntary confinement for those who have committed no crime is the natural state of
individuals in this country [17].
In the juvenile case, although the Court rejected the notion that minors were
entitled to the same panoply of due process protections as were adults [18], it
ruled that (a) the risk of error inherent in parental decision making as to
institutionalization was great enough to mandate an independent inquiry by a
"neutral factfinder," (b) the informal inquiry must "carefully probe the child's
background using all available services," (c) the decision-maker could refuse to
admit a child not meeting medical admission standards, and (d) need for
continued commitment must be periodically reviewed by an independent
procedure [19].
Finally, in a case involving the transfer of a convicted felon to a mental
hospital, the Court substantially affirmed the decision of a district court judge
ruling that procedural due process protections applied [20], holding that even a
prisoner had a protected liberty interest implicated by a prison-hospital transfer;
even though his freedeom was obviously curtailed in the prison, he still retained a
"residuum of liberty" [21] which would be infringed upon by such a transfer. The
loss of liberty involved more than merely "a loss of freedom from confinement"
[22]; the patient's potential exposure to "compelled treatment in the form of
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mandatory behavior modification programs" [23] was a "major change in the
conditions of confinement amounting to a grievous loss" [24] to the inmate.
Noted the court:
Were an ordinary citizen to be subjected involuntarily to these consequences, it is undeniable that
protected liberty interests would be unconstitutionally infringed absent compliance with the
procedures required by the due process clause. We conclude that a convicted felon also is entitled to
the benefit of procedures appropriate in the circumstances before he is found to have a mental disease
and transferred to a mental hospital [25].
The Court thus has made it clear that procedural due process protections apply to
all aspects of the civil commitment hearing, and that it will carefully scrutinize the
cases before it in order to ascertain whether the specific fact setting (e.g. juvenile,
prison transers) causes it to modify its basic holdings. It is clearly comfortable with
the due process model [26]; there should be no expectation that this will be
drastically modified in the near future.
Right to Treatment
The right to treatment was first constitutionally articulated in the historic
Alabama case of Wyatt v. Stickney [27], where the court ruled that involuntary
committed patients had a constitutional right to receive such treatment as would
give them a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve their condition [28].
To fulfill this right, there need be (1) a humane physical and psychological
environment, (2) qualified staff personnel in sufficient numbers, and (3)
individualized treatment plans for each patient [29]; to further these standards,
detailed environmental standards were established, ranging in subject matter
from the global to the specific [30]. The right to treatment was seen as coming
within the due process clause; the promise of treatment would provide the
necessary "reasonable relationship" [31] to the purpose of commitment to satisfy
that purpose [32]. It was not until 1982, however - a full decade after the first
Wyatt decisions - that the Supreme Court decided it would hear a right to
treatment appeal [33].
There, in Youngberg v. Romeo, a damages case involving a mentally retarded
resident of a state school who alleged violation of his constitutional right to
protection from harm (after being injured seriously more than 60 times) [34], the
Court ruled that such persons have substantive constitutional rights to "adequate
food, shelter, clothing and medical care" [35], to "personal security" [36], to
"freedom from bodily restraint" [37], and to minimally adequate or reasonable
training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint" [38]. In determining
whether a patient's training was "reasonable" the court imposed the following
standard:
[L]iability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure
from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person
responsible did not base the decision on such a judgment [39].
The plaintiff in this case enjoyed, the court concluded, "constitutionally protected
interests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably non-restrictive
confinement conditions and such training as may be required by these interests"
[40].
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The case leaves open many questions: how would the court rule in a case
(unlike this one, where only limited relief was sought) which raised the question of
a broad per se right to treatment? Is a mental patient entitled to broader or
narrower rights (or the same rights) than a mentally retarded person? What will
the impact on practice of the new liability standard be? How would the court rule
in a case in which money damages had not been raised? Although the answers to
these questions are not clear, itis significant that the Court did issue an affirmative
statement on the right to treatment; it can be expected that future decisions will
build on the Youngberg case.
Right to Refuse Treatment
The area of the right to refuse treatment is often seen as the cutting edge of the
relationship between mental health professions and the law. It encompasses
virtually all other patients' rights and raises the most persistent and macrocosmic
questions as to the extent of control which can be exerted by a treater over a
person who may not wish to participate in the treatment process in question. Its
resolution may well sketch the further contours of all relationships between
patients and mental health professionals, especially in hospital settings.
Two recent cases have set the stage for the legal debate on the extent of the
right. In the first,Rennie v. Klein [41], the Federal Third Circuit Court of Appeals
substantially affirmed a district court decision from New Jersey, holding that
involuntary patients retain the constitutional right to refuse the administration of
antipsychotic drugs that may have permanently disabling side effects [42]. In
making this finding, the court cited "dramatic" evidence in the record that "the
risk of serious side effects stemming from the administration of antipsychotic
drugs is a critical factor in our determination that a liberty interest is infringed by
forced medication" [43]. To vindicate this right, compliance with informal
requirements of a state administrative policy - calling for treatment team
consultations with outside psychiatrists - were sufficient [44]; more stringent
protections (such as formal hearings) were not mandated. The other case, Rogers
v. Okin [45], had also held that patients had a constitutionally protected interest
in being left free by the state to decide whether to submit to "serious and
potentially harmful medical treatment represented by the administration of
antipsychotic drugs" [46].
In both cases, the Supreme Court was asked to take the matter on appeal. It
immediately granted certiorari in Rogers, and subsequently issued its decision,
sidestepping the constitutional questions and remanding the case to the First
Circuit Court of Appeals for that court to consider the impact of an intervening
Massachusetts state court decision [47]. That case had held that a
non-institutionalized but mentally incompetent person did have the right to assert
his right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs at a judicial hearing, a
decision based strongly on state common law [48].
However, in the course of its opinion, the Supreme Court noted that all parties
agreed that "the Constitution recognizes a liberty interest in avoiding the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs" [49]. With this as a baseline, the
court underscored a major principle of constitutional litigation: a state is free,
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under its own constitution or common law, to create liberty or due process
interests broader than those mandated under the federal constitution [50]. It thus
remanded the case for reconsideration. Finally, just a week after the court issued
this decision, it granted certiorari nRennie, the New Jersey case, and immediately
remanded it for reconsideration in light of its decision in Youngberg, the right to
treatment case [51].
Again, there are unanswered questions: Is the court likely to ever take
another right to refuse treatment case? If it does, how far will it go in finding a
right? Does its allusion in a footnote in the Massachusetts case to the issue of the
drugs' "significant risk of side effects" [52] give a sense that it will be sympathetic
to patients' claims? However the court ultimately defines the right, how much
procedural due provess will be necessary to vindicate it? It will clearly be some
time before these questions are all answered satisfactorily; until then, it is
expected that this area of the law will remain in a severe state of flux. One thing,
though, is certain; the court had the opportunity in Rogers to reject out of hand
the notion of a constitutional right to refuse treatment; the fact that it did not do
that-that it, in fact, assumed that such a rightdid exist-should give some sense to
the idea that the court is comfortable, at the least, with the theoretical
underpinnings of the right.
Conclusion
After nearly two centuries of inaction, the United States Supreme Court has acted
in over a half-dozen cases dealing squarely with the constitutional rights of mental
patients [53]. Although both plaintiffs and defendants could rightfully claim
victory in several of the mitigated cases, in final analysis, it appears clear that the
Court has chosen to take seriously the claims of mental patients that they are
entitled to that "equal access to justice" [54] which other American citizens have
traditionally taken for granted. As a result, the mentally disabled person can no
longer be perceived as ". . . someone to whom attention need not be paid" [55].
The Supreme Court, to be sure, is paying attention.
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